Kinaesthetic activities in physics instruction:Image schematic justification and design based on didactic situations by Bruun, Jesper & Christiansen, Frederik V
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Kinaesthetic activities in physics instruction
Bruun, Jesper; Christiansen, Frederik V
Published in:
NorDiNa: Nordic Studies in Science Education
Publication date:
2016
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Bruun, J., & Christiansen, F. V. (2016). Kinaesthetic activities in physics instruction: Image schematic
justification and design based on didactic situations. NorDiNa: Nordic Studies in Science Education, 12(1), 56-
72.
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
[56] 12(1), 2016
Jesper Bruun is associate professor at the Department of Science Education. With a background in physics, he has ex-
tensive experience with researching and developing kinesthetic models and learning activities - primarily in physics. His 
research interests also include semiotics in science education and representational forms.
Frederik V. Christiansen is associate professor at the Department of Pharmacy and has a background in physics and 
philosophy. He has long experience with analysing teaching, and with developing and applying philosophical concepts 
in science education research.
JESPER BRUUN 
Department of Science Education, Faculty of Science, University of Copenhagen
jbruun@ind.ku.dk
FREDERIK V. CHRISTIANSEN 
Department of Pharmacy, Faculty of Health & Medical Sciences, University of Copenhagen
frederik.christiansen@sund.ku.dk
Kinaesthetic activities in physics instruction: 
Image schematic justification and design based 
on didactical situations
Abstract
One of the major difficulties in learning physics is for students to develop a conceptual understan-
ding of the core concepts of physics. Many authors argue that students’ conceptions of basic physical 
phenomena are rooted in image schemas, originating in fundamental kinaesthetic experiences of 
being. We argue that this idea should be utilised in physics instruction, that kinaesthetic activities will 
provide useful entry point for students’ construction of physics conceptions. We discuss the nature of 
image schemas and focus particularly on one: effort-resistance-flow. This schema is fundamental not 
only in our everyday experience, but also in most of school physics. We argue that performing kina-
esthetic activities can support student understanding and intuitions with respect to central physics 
concepts. We use the Theory of Didactical Situations to design a lesson, which targets effort-resistan-
ce-flow. In this lesson, a kinaesthetic activity takes centre stage in both adidactical (fully autonomous) 
and didactical (less autonomous) situations. 
En af de store udfordringer studerende har med at lære fysik er at udvikle en begrebsmæssig forstå-
else af fysikkens centrale begreber. Mange forfattere hævder, at studerendes opfattelser af grundlæg-
gende fysiske fænomener er forankret i billedskemaer med oprindelse i grundlæggende kinæstetiske 
erfaringer i verden. Hvis sådanne skemaer har en kropslig basis, bør det kunne udnyttes i fysikun-
dervisningen. Derfor argumenterer vi for at kinæstetiske aktiviteter med omhyggelige eksperientielle 
og begrebsmæssige analyser, kan hjælpe studerendes grundlæggende begrebsdannelser i fysik. Vi 
diskuterer  billedskemaers karakter og fokuserer især på ét: effort-resistance-flow. Vi hævder, at dette 
skema er grundlæggende ikke kun i vores daglige erfaring, men også i mange grene af fysikken. Vi 
argumenterer for, at kinæstetiske aktiviteter kan understøtte elevernes forståelse af og intuitioner om 
centrale fysik begreber. Vi bruger Teorien om Didaktiske Situationer til at designe en lektion, målret-
tet imod effort-resistance-flow. Både adidaktiske og didaktiske situationer er struktureret omkring 
en kinæstetisk aktivitet i lektionen. 
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Introduction
Physics teachers have long been using activities where students either directly feel or represent physi-
cal entities in instruction. Examples include using students to illustrate the principles of refraction of 
light, how electrons move in a circuit (e.g. Singh, 2010), or how atoms behave in a gas, fluid, or solid 
(e.g. McSharry & Jones, 2000). Often, these activities are seen as illustrations that make learning 
physics more motivating or fun. Models are often meant to illustrate the underlying mechanisms of 
a physical phenomenon rather than having students actively link their experiences to a conceptual 
understanding of the laws of physics. 
Such activities have been described in physics education literature as participatory simulations (e.g. 
Collela, 2000), analogical roleplaying (e.g. Aubusson & Fogwill, 2006), drama (Ødegaard, 2003), 
Energy Theater™ (Scherr et al. 2013), and kinaesthetic learning activities (e.g. Begel, Garcia, & Wolf-
man, 2004). Common to all these activities is that students enact physical entities in order to under-
stand scientific phenomena and concepts. Both from a cognitive and from a social aspect, kinaesthetic 
activities can have a positive effect on student learning and classroom environments (e.g. Aubusson 
& Fogwill, 2006; McSharry & Jones, 2000). Embodied experiences may play a key role when learning 
science. Niebert, Marsch, and Treagust (2012) show that analogies in science teaching need to be em-
bodied in order for them to be successful. Particularly, they show that even an embodied experience 
does not guarantee success, if the learning demand of the student is not taken into account. This paper 
aims at further developing these insights into a theoretical argument based on cognitive or epistemo-
logical perspectives that justify and motivate using kinaesthetic learning activities in physics teaching 
at secondary and tertiary levels.
The starting point is a closer consideration of the nature of the students’ preconceptions and their 
connection to how physics learning can be viewed from the perspective of embodied cognition. After 
that we show how embodied cognition allows us to consider kinaesthetic activities as viable parts 
of learning activities that shape student understanding of mechanics. Specifically, we argue that an 
image schema effort-resistance-flow lies at the root of many areas of physics and of students’ eve-
ryday observations. We then identify three types of kinaesthetic activities two in which effort-resis-
tance-flow is crucial for linking student experiences with formal physics knowledge. For a particular 
kinaesthetic activity, we analyse student-generated examples of such linking. As an extension of the 
argument, we use the Theory of Didactical Situations (Brousseau, 2002; Ruthven, Laborde, Leach, & 
Tiberghien, 2009) to design a lesson for teaching mechanics using a kinaesthetic activity.
Student conceptions of physical phenomena
When studying mechanics, students are supposed to achieve a so-called Newtonian understanding 
of the mechanical world. A vast amount of literature has documented that traditional lecture based 
instruction is insufficient to achieve this goal (see e.g. Halloun & Hestenes, 1985; McDermott, 1991). 
Often students adopt surface approaches like rote memorization and pattern recognition, rather than 
developing conceptual understanding of the subject. Students exposed to traditional lecture based 
mechanics instruction generally do not end up with a Newtonian understanding of the mechanical 
world surrounding them (Crouch & Mazur, 2001).
Changing student conceptions to the desired understanding of mechanical phenomena has been add-
ressed extensively in conceptual change research (e.g. Hestenes, 2006; Gentner & Colhoun, 2010; 
McDermott, 1991; Vosniadou, 2010). A common theoretical assumption in this research tradition is 
that students possess certain cognitive structures, schemas, which shape their actions and predic-
tions. These schemas are triggered by a task perceived by the student and enacted in order to solve 
that task. Students’ conceptual frameworks (Vosniadou, 1994) or ecologies (diSessa, 2002) are belie-
ved to influence, which schemas are triggered and how they are enacted in given situations. One of 
the central questions in conceptual change theory is whether a student’s conceptual understanding is 
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stable across contexts, and thus theory-like, or whether different contexts are likely to trigger diffe-
rent schemas even if the formal knowledge is the same. It is a common finding that conceptual change 
does not come about easily. Even when teachers address preconceptions explicitly, students do not 
necessarily adopt the formally correct views in their everyday lives. It is difficult for learners to use 
Newtonian thinking outside a narrow context. 
There is reason to question the robustness and consistency of students’ misconceptions. As pointed 
out by diSessa (1993), the view that students have misconceptions that are stable and which must be 
confronted, is not only at odds with the basic idea of constructivism (that students should construct 
their knowledge on the basis of what they already know), but also not necessary to explain the expe-
rimental findings of the conceptual change literature. Another way of stating this point is to ask, what 
the epistemic status of these misconceptions is supposed to be. Are they coherent theories or are they 
rather ad-hoc hypotheses? 
In an overview of conceptual change theories Özdemir and Clark (2007) describe two different trends 
in conceptual change research. The first, labelled knowledge-as-theory (e.g. Chi, 1992; Posner, Stri-
ke, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Vosniadou, 1994), views students’ conceptions as theory-like structu-
res, which provide the students with relatively unified, robust, and coherent views rooted in persis-
tent epistemological beliefs. From the second perspective, knowledge-in-pieces (e.g. Brown, 1995; 
Clark, 2006; diSessa, 1988, 2014), students’ mental structures are seen as less coherent with “mul-
tiple quasi-independent” elements loosely connected and brought together in a more ad-hoc man-
ner. The distinction is important because it has direct implications for instructional approaches. For 
instance, from the knowledge-as-theory perspective establishing “cognitive conflicts” may be aimed 
at in instruction, which may lead the student toward fundamental accommodative change of mental 
structures. From a Piagetian perspective, this is a reconstruction of the schema (Piaget, 1952). From 
the knowledge-in-pieces perspective, the question of cognitive development is one of refinement of 
existing mental structures rather than replacement of them. In our view, changes in knowledge-in-
pieces happen incrementally. They resemble assimilation, the idea that the schema is fundamentally 
expanded but not reconstructed (Piaget, 1952), more than assimilation. 
Özdemir and Clark argue that recent studies have provided empirical evidence for the knowledge-in-
pieces perspective. In addition, other studies indicate problems related to the knowledge-as-theory 
perspective. For instance, some studies show that the same students do not use the same miscon-
ceptions consistently. Thus, Hestenes (2006) reports that nearly all students are inconsistent in ap-
plying the same concept in different situations. This finding can be understood in terms of students’ 
conceptual profiles and their awareness of their own profiles (Mortimer, 1995). Conceptual profiles 
model the way students apply different ideas of a concept from experientially inferred ideas to highly 
abstract ideas. One of the goals for teaching is for students to “recognise different domains of each 
idea as well as their hierarchical framework, where some ideas explain others” (Mortimer, 1995, p. 
282). In this view, different knowledge-pieces are not to be replaced, but through teaching, students 
should become aware of how to use them appropriately. 
The premise for solving conceptual problems correctly is that the student is familiar with the gene-
ral law and deductively applies it to the situation at hand and reaches a conclusion. However, if the 
student does not know which law to use or does not have knowledge of the general law to be used, 
the problem becomes one of establishing a relationship between the situation at hand, expected out-
comes and an ad-hoc generated hypothesis. Then, “misconceptions” are constructed in an ad-hoc 
manner as responses to the encountered conceptual problem. In the situation at hand, they present 
themselves as likely explanations to the phenomenon or as likely strategies for solving the problem. 
It therefore seems unlikely that students actually entertain, for example, ‘Aristotelian’ theories of 
motion and apply them to conceptual problems. Rather, they may arrive at ‘Aristotelian’ notions of 
motion as a result of ad-hoc inferences. 
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The relation between student and external representation of the problem is likely important for un-
derstanding ad-hoc inferences; the way a problem is presented to the student affects how the student 
will work with the problem. For example, in Wason’s (1966) four-card selection task, subjects are to 
deduce logically which cards to turn to determine the truth of a rule. Shifting the context from an ab-
stract (numbers and colours) to a social (beer and age) context has been shown to influence subjects’ 
ability to answer the task correctly (e.g. Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2000). Similarly, Zhang and 
Norman (1994) found that external representations “change the nature of the task” (p. 119), and that 
they “can anchor and structure cognitive behaviour” (p. 119) This points towards a view of conceptual 
systems, which is rooted not only in the minds of students but also in their surroundings and in the 
relation between students and surroundings. 
The role of embodiment when learning physics
How come some students arrive at the right Newtonian conclusions while others do not? Andrea 
diSessa argues that understanding this question involves moving towards a systems perspective of 
knowledge with a multitude of mental substructures and diverse knowledge forms invoked in diffe-
rent situations (diSessa, 1993, pp. 148-149). Notable among these are the so-called p-prims or pheno-
menological primitives, which are theoretical structures that are hypothesised to be used in human 
conceptualisation. The term ‘primitive’ is used to designate that the p-prims are used with no need for 
further explanation and that they are atomic mental structures (diSessa, 1993, p. 112). P-prims are re-
lated to different types of phenomena familiar from everyday life, for instance phenomena pertaining 
to force and agency or constraint phenomena. However, they have an uneasy relationship to language, 
and we need to turn to the related idea of image schemas in cognitive linguistics. 
Metaphor, image schemas, p-prims
Cognitive linguistics is the study of the relationships between human language and patterns of thought 
(Evans & Green, 2006). One of the very influential ideas in cognitive linguistics is that our embodied 
experiences can become encoded in language, and serve as a means for interaction. Thus, there are 
branches of cognitive linguistics, pioneered by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Lakoff, 1987, 1993; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Johnson, 1987), which reject a separation between body and mind and 
assumes a connection between individual cognition and social interaction.  Recently, studies have 
applied ideas from cognitive linguistics in science education research (e.g. Amin, 2009; Jeppsson, 
Haglund, Amin, & Strömdahl, 2013; Niebert et al., 2012), and many authors have stressed the impor-
tance of metaphor and analogy in learning processes (e.g. diSessa, 1983; Gentner & Colhoun, 2010; 
Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1987). Basically, the idea 
of learning by analogy is that the learner has a good understanding of the conceptual topology of a 
base domain and maps this conceptual structure unto a less well understood target domain (Lakoff, 
1993), thereby providing conceptual structure to the target domain. 
According to Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) metaphors get their conceptual structure or topology 
through image schemas. Image schemas are pre-linguistic structures acquired through our basic bo-
dily experiences, for instance, part-whole, source-path-target, up-down, and center-perifery (see 
Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). Image schemas are extremely general, and serve as phenomenologi-
cal building blocks of our cognition, and the foundation for analogy and metaphor: Two conceptual 
domains may be seen as similar with reference to a common image schematic structure. Thus, for 
instance, the conceptual metaphor life is a journey lends is basic conceptual topology from the sour-
ce-path-target image schema related to the experience of going from somewhere to somewhere else. 
This basic schema provides structure to the concept of journey, and is projected unto life. 
One of our most fundamental experiences is the bodily experience of exerting effort, experiencing 
resistance and giving rise to flow. This basic experience gives rise to the image schema effort-resis-
tance-flow. Johnson’s (1987) description of force-based image schemas may be seen as aspects of 
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effort-resistance-flow. Similarly, Andersson (1986) used conceptual metaphor theory to introduce 
what he called the experiential gestalt of causation (EGC). For Andersson, the EGC has roots in early 
experiences with an agent (e.g. a child) giving energy (e.g. causing movement) to an object. More ab-
stract patterns of causation can be assimilated into the EGC; for example, fire can be the agent, feeling 
of warmth the energy, and a person the object. As a person moves closer to the fire that person will 
experience more effect. Effort-resistance-flow can easily be seen as part of the topology of EGC, but 
we agree with Andersson that the EGC develops beyond the early kinaesthetic experiences (Anders-
son, 1986). 
Effort-resistance-flow may also be related to Talmy’s force dynamics (Talmy, 1988), which he uses to 
describe language construals. A central theme in Talmy’s framework is the interplay between rest and 
movement. For example, things that are at rest can be caused to move and vice versa. The cause of the 
change in movement is a battle between two force entities that are opposed. Talmy shows examples of 
how scientists use language in this way to talk about scientific phenomena and processes, even if they 
know that the depiction is not strictly correct. 
Effort-resistance-flow might be close to identical with the so-called “Ohm’s p-prim”. Ohm’s p-prim 
is absolutely crucial in making sense of mechanical phenomena (diSessa, 1993) as well as an abun-
dance of other physics phenomena, for example, Newton’s cooling law (diSessa, 2014). diSessa even 
argues that Ohm’s p-prim stretches beyond physics into everyday domains (diSessa, 1993, 2002). 
This p-prim concerns “an agent that is the locus of an impetus that acts against a resistance to 
produce some sort of result” (diSessa, 1993, p. 126). Thus, this p-prim surely has a bodily basis – the 
act of pushing material objects, experiencing resistance and causing a resulting movement (diSessa, 
1993, p. 126; see also Hestenes, 2010). We agree with Jeppsson et al. (2013) that it may be fruitful to 
see image schemas as the underlying cognitive structures, while different manifestations integrate 
schemas in different ways. Combining Amin’s (2009) view that conceptual metaphors could be con-
strued as a resource for conceptual change, Sherin’s (2001) work on symbolic forms, and diSessa’s 
caution that p-prims are difficult to observe, Jeppsson et al. (2013) argue that image schemas could 
be classified according to the function they serve. In this way, image schemas are the source domains 
of conceptual metaphors when they are projected to a conceptual domain, while p-prims denote, 
when image schemas “are not conventionally associated with any external representational structure” 
(Jeppsson et al. 2013, p. 82). 
It is also easy to see how effort-resistance-flow may lead to false conclusions about the nature of 
motion. For instance, a common ‘misconception’ is the idea that, disregarding drag, heavier objects 
fall faster than light objects (Hestenes, Wells, & Swackhammer, 1992). It is easy to demonstrate that 
this is not the case; in most everyday situations, drag does not have a big influence on the fall time. 
So how do many students arrive at this conclusion so easily refuted by experience? One explanation 
is that they are making a metaphorical mapping from bodily experience using effort-resistance-flow. 
Students know from their own bodily experience that lifting a heavy object requires more effort than 
lifting a lighter one, and reason conversely that the heavier object must fall faster when falling towards 
the earth. As shown by Niebert et al. (2012), this inference can be understood as a misalignment bet-
ween direct experience and the target domain within Newtonian physics. The faulty inference might 
result from students drawing on the experience of lifting rather than with things that fall. The source 
does not correspond with the target. Niebert et al. (2012) further show that even with the correct em-
bodied source, the teaching situation needs to take into account the learning demand of the student. 
Thus, if students rely on the feeling of impact of objects that fall, drawing on their experiences with 
things that fall may not facilitate the correct inference, whereas drawing on or creating experiences 
with reacting to a falling object might help. 
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Figure 1. An illustration effort-resistance-flow. 
To sum up, we conceptualise effort-resistance-flow much like Halloun and Hestenes (1985) describe 
Buridan’s concept of ‘impetus’. However, context might change its appearance. For example, the ex-
pressed idea that motion must have a cause (Hestenes et al., 1992) can be associated with this schema, 
resulting in ‘Aristotelian’ thinking (see Figure 1). However, as diSessa (2014) shows effort-resistance-
flow (Ohm’s p-prim) can be used productively in teaching: Through a process of coordinating p-prims 
related to agency, effort and equilibrium, students were able to reproduce accurate descriptions of 
Newton’s cooling law. In this process binding p-prims to correct formal concepts, and subsequent 
eliciting of some of the chains of reasoning were crucial. Just as Niebert et al. (2012), this shows that 
the task for instruction is to create learning situations, which allow phenomenological experiences to 
be engaged productively to build conceptions in line with formal physics.
Effort-resistance-flow as a central topology in the structure of physics
Effort-resistance-flow is not at odds with physics but lies at the heart of physics. In many physical 
disciplines the central physical variables either drive motion or describe it (Borutzky, 2010). Thus, 
contemporary energy bond graph theory as used in engineering considers effort-variables (e.g. force, 
voltage, hydrodynamic pressure) and flow-variables (e.g. velocity, current, volumetric flow rate). The 
relation of these variables signifies an “energy bond”, i.e. a power transmission. Energy bond graph 
relies on an analogy between physics domains that was first developed by Maxwell and has been de-
veloped in the methodology of energy bond graphs (Paynter, 1961). Table 1 lists examples of effort and 
flow-variables along with pictures of prototypical systems. 
The similarities between different physics domains have been utilised in physics instruction. For 
example, the Karlsruhe Physics Course (Hermann, 2000) utilises a substance-like metaphor to intro-
duce momentum, electric charge, and amount of substance as corresponding entities across domains. 
Changes in these quantities with respect to time are currents, and thus force, electrical current, and 
volumetric flow rate are currents. They conceptualise difference in potentials as the driving forces of 
the current. Notice that in Table 1 force is an effort variable, and this is inconsistent with the Karlsruhe 
Physics Course conceptualisation of it being a current. Borutzky (2010) notes that both conceptuali-
sations are valid, but changing conceptualisation will change the analogy between mechanics and, for 
example, electronics. 
‘
“Aristotelean 
thinking”
“Impetus 
thinking”
“Newtonian 
thinking”
context 
dependent
reasoning from 
image schema
eort ow
resistance
Abstract image schema
movement?
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While effort-resistance-flow seems like a central image schematic foundation for physics, many other 
image schemas may influence conceptions of physics. For example, containers (e.g. using Gauss bo-
xes to calculate electric fields), end-of-path (ray diagrams in optics), scale (e.g. units), cycles (plane-
tary motion), and balance (e.g. statistical mechanics) may all be relevant. What is special about effort-
resistance-flow is that it is likely central to the sense of mechanism (diSessa, 1993) experienced by 
people successfully performing and learning physics, because it is tightly connected to our being able 
to interact with entities in the world. This fundamental insight should be utilised in teaching by devi-
sing experiments and teaching that explores the analogy between the students’ basic bodily experien-
ces and physical concepts and language. Our being in the world shapes our language and concepts via 
image schemas in what appears to be an evolutionary way. That is, with somewhat random variations 
and selection based on best fits to the current situation. Teaching with kinaesthetic activities should 
be able capitalise on this by designing situations in which concepts and language consistent with phy-
sics are more viable than concepts and language, which are not. Such teaching would be dependent 
on designed situations where explanations that are consistent with physics language and conceptions 
provide the best fit to the situation. 
Different types of kinaesthetic activities
Energy bond graphs exploit underlying common effort-flow structures of different areas of physics 
(see Borutzky, 2010). Using that line of thinking, we propose that kinaesthetic learning activities can 
exploit underlying image schemas in connecting human experience with different areas of physics. 
Table 1. Examples of variables that are used in systems modelling in engineering and proposed 
relation to the effort-resistance-flow image schema. In each of these systems, we can identify effort 
and flow variables and also resistances. 
Domain Effort (sym-
bol [SI unit])
Flow (symbol 
[SI unit])
Resistance Prototypical system
Linear mechan-
ics
Force (F [N]) Velocity 
(v [])
Mechanical resis-
tance (Rasmus-
sen, 1994)
F v
Electric circuits Voltage 
(U [V]) 
Current 
(I [A])
Electrical resis-
tance
R
I
U
Hydrodynamics Pressure 
(P [Pa])
Volumetric 
flow rate 
(Q [])
Pipe resistance 
(Lautrup, 2011)
A1
v1 v2 p0
A2
p
Embodied Kinaesthetic 
sensation of 
applying effort
Kinaesthetic 
sensation of 
flow
Felt resistance
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In one type of activity, students use effort-resistance-flow as a basis for relating their experiences 
(source) to Newtonian mechanics (target). Since the students really are mechanical objects, there 
is no material difference between the two domains: Newtonian mechanics describe motion in the 
human domain. Utilizing the human body as an object in physics learning is not new (e.g. Bernhard, 
2010; Pendrill & Williams, 2005), but the kind of activity proposed here does not necessarily involve 
digital sensors. 
Another type of activity has students enact the mechanisms of a physics model or theory. Students 
enacting electrons in a circuit (Singh, 2010) may use effort-resistance-flow to connect the push from 
other students to the effect of voltage in the circuit. The working hypothesis of such activities is that 
it is possible to make a mechanical kinaesthetic model with the same types of relations between va-
riables, as there would be in an electrical, thermodynamic, hydrodynamic, or quantum mechanical 
system. Unlike the first activity, the source domain is materially different from the target domain. 
In a third type of activity, students may use other image schemas (such as containment) when enacting 
aspects of a model or theory. One could argue students in Energy Theater™ (Scherr et al., 2013) make 
use of, among other things, containment and conduit metaphors to embody their understanding and 
discussions of energy transfer processes. Again, the source and target domains are materially diffe-
rent, and other image schemas are in play. 
In the last two types of activities, the source domain (mechanics/phenomenological experience) is 
different from the target domains (electrical circuits and energy transfer). Here, the embodied expe-
riences are used to target image schemas, which are then mapped to the domain of physics by means 
of conceptual metaphor (Niebert & Gropengiesser, 2015)
It is important to recognise that students are not performing movements to stimulate the brain to 
learn better (Hannaford, 1995). Rather, they should use their experiences with enacting models to 
discern physics concepts. For example, if a student pulls at another student with a rope, they will both 
feel pressure from the rope and tension in their bodies, even if they do not identify the pull as a force 
in a Newtonian way. The point is to relate these bodily experiences to formal physics.  
An activity relevant for teaching mechanics
In this section, we provide an example of a kinaesthetic model (Bruun, 2009; Johannsen & Bruun, 
2014) designed for teaching Newtonian mechanics, in particular, linear motion (see Figure 2). 
Furthermore, we show two examples of how student writings show evidence of them having employed 
effort-resistance-flow in the kinaesthetic activity. We distinguish between the kinaesthetic activity, 
which is what students perform in the didactical environment, and the kinaesthetic model, which is 
an idealisation of the activity useful for planning. 
Figure 2:  Drawing of the kinaesthetic experiential model discussed below. One student is sitting on 
a slab of plastic while being pulled by another student. In practice, some students hold on to the rope 
directly, while others attach it to the slab.
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Below are examples from Danish first year upper secondary students, ages 15-16, with little prior 
knowledge of Newtonian mechanics. As part of a scientific outreach program, a class of 30 students 
participated in a 90-minute lesson in which they were asked to perform kinaesthetic learning acti-
vities (as described by Johannsen & Bruun, 2014). The first author of this paper and the students’ 
regular physics teacher both taught the lesson. During the activity, students discussed and filled out 
a worksheet (see Appendix A for a modified version) by writing down (1) descriptions of their kina-
esthetic experiences, (2) physics concepts they believed were relevant to their experience, and (3) 
explanations that related experiences with concepts. These sheets were collected after the lesson, 
and we show examples of these writings in Table 2 and 3 below. Bracketed text, [text], represents the 
authors’ extrapolation. 
Table 2.  An example from a student describing the kinaesthetic experience of pulling/being pulled 
while sitting on a slab while holding on the rope. 
The example in Table 2 clearly reflects the topology of effort-resistance-flow. The physical concept of 
(G-)forces acting through the string is imprecise, and the explanation also follows the effort-resistan-
ce-flow topology (the felt resistance is reduced if the flow increases quickly). It is tempting to catego-
rise the example as an ‘impetus misconception’, but the explanation may be productive. Formally, the 
force needed on the box/sitting person to sustain a constant velocity may be taken as independent of 
the velocity. However, increasing the velocity would require a larger force. Taking this as a starting 
point, a teacher might tease out an appropriate explanation and thus help students map their experi-
ences to the language of formal physics,. 
Table 3.  A student’s description of the kinaesthetic experience of pulling a slab. 
Table 3 shows a case where effort is connected to balance. But the puller needs to use more effort. This 
example could be interpreted as a misconception, where the puller provides the most force since the 
puller is active while the pulled person is regarded as passive (see Hestenes et al., 1992). However, the 
student may experience more force in the vertical direction when standing compared to sitting. The 
rope tension has a vertical component, which points down for the student standing up and points up 
for the sitting student. Thus, a larger normal force acts from the floor on the standing student than 
on the sitting student, and this may be felt as requiring more effort. A teacher could help students 
generalise the descriptions to Newton’s 3rd law, by focusing on the interaction between the standing 
and the sitting student, and downplaying the vertical interaction with the floor. 
Kinaesthetic experience Physics concept Explanation
The more effort [forces?] the 
faster it went. [It became] 
easier [to pull]
The force goes through the 
string. G-force. 
You have to start out running 
really fast because then it quickly 
gets easier [to pull]
Kinaesthetic experience Physics concept Explanation
Both need to provide [effort] so 
[that] you can keep the balance. 
However, “the puller” needs to 
use more [effort]. 
Resistance force When I pull, getting the slab go-
ing is the hardest. 
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As is evident, students are not likely to miraculously derive important physics concepts simply by 
performing kinaesthetic learning activities. Guiding questions, validating reasoning, and timely 
explanations are essential elements of the teacher’s toolbox when using kinaesthetic activities just 
as they are in any kind of teaching. The next section illustrates how the model shown in Figure 2 
can be used in teaching. 
Framing physics teaching by using kinaesthetic learning activities
The Theory of Didactical Situations (TDS; Brousseau, 2002) is a design and analytical framework 
developed for mathematics. However, it has proven usable for a wide variety of subjects, including 
physics (Ruthven et al., 2009; Tiberghien et al., 2009). Ruthven et al. (2009) describe in detail, 
how TDS allows designers to incorporate abstract elements from grand theories of learning in 
teaching designs that can be realised in a classroom. Two notions were instrumental in informing 
TDS is in its original form. The first was Bachelard’s (2002) notion of the epistemological obstacle, 
which is “[…] the effect of a previous piece of knowledge which was interesting and successful, but 
which now is revealed as false or simply unadapted” (Brousseau, 2002, p. 82).  The second was 
Piaget’s (1952) notions of disequilibration and accommodation. 
TDS revolves around the concept of adidactical situations where students are engaged directly 
in “solving a novel type of problem, refining their concepts and strategies in the light of feedback 
from a (material and social) milieu”  (Ruthven et al., 2009, p. 330).  There are three crucial ele-
ments to an adidactical situation: A task that will have the students autonomously engaged with 
the knowledge to be learned. In this example, two central tasks are to explain kinaesthetic expe-
riences in terms of formal physics (see Appendix A, task 3) and to devise a thought experiment 
to determine if any one of the two participants pulls more than the other (Appendix, task 4). The 
second component is comprised by the conditions under which the task will be solved. In this 
lesson, materials such as rope and slabs, worksheets, student groups of three, and an open set-
ting with multiple surfaces comprise these conditions. Finally, an adidactical situation will need 
to specify an expected progression towards the knowledge to be constructed. In this lesson it is 
for students to perform and discuss the kinaesthetic activity several times in order to map their 
kinaesthetic experience of effort-resistance-flow to a concept of force that is consistent with New-
tonian mechanics. 
The autonomy of the student is essential in adidactical situations:
“Between the moment the student accepts the problem as if it were her own and the mo-
ment when she produces her answer, the teacher refrains from interfering and suggesting 
the knowledge that she wants to see appear. The student knows very well that the problem 
was chosen to help her acquire a new piece of knowledge, but she must also know that this 
knowledge is entirely justified by the internal logic of the situation and that she can construct 
it without appealing to didactical reasoning.” (Brousseau, 2002, p. 30)
According to Brousseau (2002), adidactical situations are embedded in a broader didactical situa-
tion, which consists of consists of all decisions made by the teacher during the lesson - including 
decisions about how and when to scaffold students. 
Given the emphasis on autonomy, teachers need to plan the adidactical situation carefully. As an 
example, consider a task where students are asked pinpoint in which muscles they experience the 
sensation of pulling when standing and when sitting. A student standing up will likely experience 
this both in arms and legs, but may see this experience as one. To complete the task successfully 
students should be able to (1) compare standing up with sitting down, and (2) use their sensations 
in each case to distinguish between effort in their legs and effort in their arms. Thus, teaching 
must ensure that all students try out both standing and sitting. Successful mapping of a single ex-
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perience of pulling to two separate sensations is likely a process of accommodation for some students. 
Taking this view, the preceding disequilibration should be facilitated by a task, which asks students to 
consider which parts of their bodies are used in the movement (see Appendix, task 2). The mapping 
may later be used to analyse the kinaesthetic activity as a physical system, thus becoming of use for 
the students in the teaching context. 
The materials (e.g. rope, handles, and slabs), the worksheets, group sizes, and even the setting (in-
cluding how other students and the teacher act) comprise didactical variables that can be adjusted, 
added or removed. For this lesson, groups of three emphasise the focus on three particular roles: one 
standing/walking, one sitting, and one observing. This choice stages a discussion where students 
compare and contrast different experiences when making explanations. Another didactical variable is 
how and when the teacher asks questions that facilitate dialogue. The teacher might ask students to 
investigate different ways of performing the activity: If the knowledge to be constructed is Newton’s 
3rd law students might benefit from experimenting with symmetries and asymmetries. If two persons 
of comparable weight switch places, they should experience a comparable tension in both ends of 
the rope in both situations. However, if one person weighs much more than the other, that person 
should experience much less tension when standing than when sitting. Conversely, the lighter person 
will experience more tension when standing than when sitting. In fact, whether a person will find it 
easier to stand or sit should be dependent on difference in weight between the two participants and 
the angle of the rope. A teacher might facilitate student experiences with these asymmetries. One way 
of connecting these possible experiences to physics would then be to include spring scales as part of 
the didactical environment. These might be used to show that even if the force needed to pull a small 
person is less than that needed to pull a large person; the force needed in each end of the rope is the 
same. At a later time, a teacher may compare the situation with other situations, for example, the case 
of a large truck crashing into a small car (Hammer & Elby, 2003). The intention would then be to con-
nect students’ knowledge constructed in the situation to the truck-car situation. 
Students successful in solving the task should be on the way to bridging, what we term here, the 
phenomenological gap between everyday experiences and the abstractions of formal physics. One of 
the tasks in the worksheet (Appendix A, task 4) is to find out if anyone of the students pulls more than 
the other in the activity. As mentioned, students might use spring scales to solve this task. The goal 
is then that correct student solutions serve as a bodily-grounded source domain for generalisation. 
In this way, the knowledge produced in the adidactical situation might serve the same purposes as 
Clement’s (1993) bridging analogies. 
Figure 3 shows in schematic form how a teacher can plan for bridging the phenomenological gap. 
Following Brousseau (2002), the knowledge to be constructed by students was originally created in 
a specific context, but then decontextualised, as in some formulation of Newton’s 3rd law. A teacher 
must re-contextualise it, in this example by creating a kinaesthetic model and planning for kinaesthe-
tic activities. Following the curved arrows going to the right in Figure 3, the teacher adds context and 
thus also makes the situation more concrete. The job of teaching and learning is then for students to 
re-decontextualise the knowledge.. While the foundations of the re-decontextualisation are laid in the 
adidactical situation, the full realisation happens in the broader didactical situation. In the broader 
scheme, the role of the teacher is to validate student answers and ultimately to help students connect 
the knowledge that was developed in the classroom with formal knowledge. The relation between 
re-contextualisation and re-decontextualisation is illustrated in Figure 3 with curved arrows going 
to the left. 
TDS prescribes how to embed an adidactical situation in a didactical structure. First of all, the teacher 
distributes some of the responsibility and freedom of action to students by handing over the task and 
divulging the didactical environment. In this lesson, the teacher shows the equipment (ropes and 
slabs), and shows how to perform the activity safely without prescribing in detail how students should 
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perform the activity. In TDS, this phase is called the devolution (Brousseau, 2002).
Students then proceed to engage with the task in action phases where they perform the kinaesthetic 
activity. They formulate their explanations verbally, in writing, and through drawings in formulation 
phases.  Students validate their thinking via the feedback mechanisms in the didactical environment 
using other students, the teacher, or by revisiting the activity in validation phases. These phases are 
all part of the adidactical situation, although the teacher can choose to interfere to make the phases 
more didactical. After the initial action phase, our lesson mixes the three phases to form small “ed-
dies” of action-formulation-validation (e.g. performing-drawing-discussing). 
The teacher helps students to contextualise the intended knowledge in the final and crucial institu-
tionalisation. The idea is to connect the knowledge that has been developed during the lesson to the 
official knowledge. In this lesson the final phase of institutionalisation is comprised of a classroom 
discussion, where the teacher highlights the generalizable aspects of student experiences in the didac-
tical environment. For example, if students had made the connection between effort and size using 
spring scales during the adidactical situation, the teacher could introduce Newton’s 3rd law as a way 
of formulating the knowledge obtained in the classroom. We summarise this description in Table 4. 
The goal of this lesson is for students to inductively and by ways of analogy to use the kinaesthetic 
model to reach a higher level of abstraction than the kinaesthetic activity itself. In order to do that, 
teaching must be designed to bridge the phenomenological gap between physics learners’ kinaesthetic 
experiences and abstract physics knowledge. However, as pointed out by Niebert et al. (2012), ap-
propriate connections are not guaranteed just by having students ground understanding in embodied 
experience. Rather, connections between formal physics and phenomenological experiences become 
more likely when different didactical variables are tuned to the learning need of the students. It is for 
the teacher to decide how to scaffold students’ bridging of the phenomenological gap by including/ex-
cluding certain, sub-tasks, and strategies for interaction. The teacher’s decision will depend upon the 
students’ social and academic abilities, on the logistical setting, and the knowledge to be constructed. 
Figure 3: A model for planning and teaching with kinaesthetic models and exercises. Central to the 
lesson is bridging the phenomenological gap. The expressions N1, N2, and N3 signify Newton’s 1st, 
2nd, and 3rd law respectively. 
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With our examples, we have mostly focused on Newton’s 3rd law but a detailed analysis of the forces 
involved is also a possibility, but we want to emphasise that both are long-term goals, which we expect 
to require many adidactical situations. Whatever strategy the teacher employs to reach such goals, 
it is by promoting performance, discussion, validation, and subsequent institutionalisation of know-
ledge that we expect the application of image schemas to be modified to resonate more with physics.
Concluding remarks
We have developed an argument for using kinaesthetic activities in instruction that focuses on chan-
ging physics conceptions of students. We have argued that image schemas provide a fruitful entrance 
to facilitate this change, and that in particular the effort-resistance-flow schema is central to most 
school physics. We have been informed by literature to identify different types of kinaesthetic activi-
ties and we have specified how one may use the Theory of Didactical Situations (Brousseau, 2002) to 
design instruction that may eventually lead to conceptual change.
We hold that it makes little sense to label student understandings as right or wrong. In our view, 
(image) schemas as enacted by students have served them well (mostly) in their lives so far, a point 
made also by Linder (1993). To initiate change in student conceptual ecologies (diSessa, 2002) there 
must be a designed situation that selects for understandings consistent with formal physics. 
The image schema effort-resistance-flow is likely an ideal starting point for learning physics, as most 
school physics can be encompassed by the schematic structure as demonstrated by energy bond 
graph theory. A central aim of instruction from this perspective is that students become aware of how 
Table 4: Five phases of TDS describing a lesson that integrates the pulling model. The first column 
gives a short explanation for what occurs in each phase. The second column exemplifies the first for 
our lesson.
Phase: short explanation Example from lesson 
Devolution: Hand out material; 
unfold the didactical environment 
and task.
Teacher uses two students to show one way of performing 
the activity.
Action: Students perform the 
kinaesthetic activity and focus on 
the kinaesthetic sensations they 
experience. 
Different pairs of students try standing/walking and sitting. 
They attend to and describe their sensations. Hypotheses 
about who pulls more emerge in response to task 4 (see 
Appendix).
Formulation: Put words and images 
to kinaesthetic experiences and 
come up with (physics) explana-
tions
Students discuss where and how they experience effort in 
the different situations.  They describe bodily sensations in 
terms of physics concepts. They may design experiment in 
response to task 4 (see Appendix). 
Validation: Explanations are vali-
dated by revisiting the kinaesthetic 
activity and by student-student 
and teacher-student interactions. 
With spring scales available, they might test their hypoth-
eses. They may discuss whether their physics concepts are 
appropriate. Teacher validates and questions students’ 
discussions and actions. 
Institutionalisation: Teacher uses 
classroom dialogue to connect kin-
aesthetic experiences to physics.  
Teacher introduces Newton’s 3rd law, while highlighting the 
equal tension felt in each participants arm during a single 
performance of the activity. 
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their intuitive experience of effort-resistance-flow situations may be conceptualised and used to work 
with and explain physics phenomena. If image schemas are indeed central to human development of 
conceptual understandings, the idea that instruction might target them through kinaesthetic activi-
ties should be explored further. 
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Appendix A: Worksheet for students 
The worksheet has been modified here in two ways compared to the worksheet handed out to stu-
dents. First, it has been translated to English from Danish. Second, the original worksheet inclu-
ded a second activity with a circular movement. We have excluded this activity for the purposes of 
clarity. The lesson included Task 4, but it was administered orally.
Feel the force in two different types of movement
Purpose. In this exercise you’ll perform two kinaesthetic activities that represent physical systems. 
The idea is to apply the correct physics terms to your bodily experiences and to use these terms to 
design an experiment. 
Task 1: Do the activities for the first time. You’ll need something to sit on, a rope and two hand-
les. One of you pulls. Another is pulled. The third person observes. Make sure to switch, so all three of 
you get to try all roles. It is part of this task to find out how you do the activity. One possibility is that 
you both hold the rope, or that you tie the rope to, for example, the person being pulled. 
Remember! Take care of each other! If you run too fast, you may get hurt!
Task 2: Describe the movements. Describe the movement in detail from the beginning to 
the end. Where can you feel being pulled? What does the pulling person do? What can you ob-
serve? Try to describe the bodily observation (what you can feel) with words. If necessary, run 
the exercises again and vary the amount you pull, or how fast you run. Are there differences? 
Bodily observations can be, for example, the experience of faster and faster movement, the experi-
ence thatthe floor is uneven, or the experience of a tight rope.
Task 3: The Table. Make a table as shown below with a row for each physical observation you made. 
For each observation, write which physics concept you would use to describe it. In the explanation 
column, elaborate how you would use this concept to describe the bodily observation. The task is to 
be precise. Try to use as few physics concepts as possible for each bodily observation 
Task 4: The thought experiment.  Would you say that one of the persons is pulling more than 
the other? Design an experiment to test your claim. You do not need to perform the experiment right 
now, but you should describe it with enough detail so that someone could perform it. 
Bodily observation Physics concept Explanation
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